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Abstract
In our work  we adopted the decision-theoretic
principle of expected utility  ma~mieation  as a
paradigm  for designing  autonomous  rational agents
operating in  multi-agent environments.  Our ap-
proach  diifers from  techniques  based  on game  the-
ory; we  are not looking  for equilibria,  and  we  do
not have to assume  that the agents have arrived
at  the state  of common  knowledge.  Instead,  we
endow  an agent with a representation that  cap-
tures the agent’s knowledge  about the environment
and about the other agents, including its  knowl-
edge about their  states  of knowledge,  which  can
include what they know  about the other agents,
and so on.  This approach has been called  the
decision-theoretic  approach  to  game  theory. It
avoids some  of the drawbacks  of game-theoretic
equilibria that may  be nonunique  and do not cap-
turo off-equilibrium  behaviors,  but it does  so at the
cost of having  to represent,  process  and  continually
update  the nested  state of agent’s knowledge.
Introduction
In  systems  involving  multiple  agents,  system
builders have  traditionally  analyzed  the task domain
of interest  and, based on their  analyses,  imposed
upon  the agents certain  rules (laws, protocols) that
constrain the agents into  interacting  and communi-
cating according  to patterns that  the designer deems
desirable.
The fundamental problem  we address in  this  pa-
per,  on the other  hand, is  how  agents should make
decisions  about interactions  in  cases where they
have no common  pre-established  protocols  or con-
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ventions to  guide them.z Our argument  is  that  an
agent should rationally  apply whatever  it  does know
about the environment  and about the  capabilities,
desires,  and beliefs  of other agents to choose  (in-
ter)actions  that  it  expects will maximally  achieve
its  own  goals.  This kind of agent description  ad-
heres to the knowledge-level  view, articulated,  for
example  by Newel]  (Newell 1981), and is  a corner-
stone of artificial  intelligence, but operationalizing
it  is  a complex  design  process.
~t  our  work, we use  the  normative  decision-
theoretic  paradigm  of rational  decision-making  un-
deruncertainty,  according to  which  an agent should
rnakd decisions so as to maximize  its  expected  util-
ity  (Coles  et  al.  1975; Doyle 1992; Feldman  &
SiSroull  1977; Haddawy  & Hanks 1990; Jacobs &
Kiefer 1973; Russell &  Norvig  1995). Decision the-
ory is  applicable to agents interacting  with other
agents because  of uncertainty: The  abilities,  sens-
ing capabilities,  beliefs, goals, preferences,  and in-
tentions  of other agents clearly  are not directly
observable  and  usually  are  not  known  with  cer-
tainty.  In  decision  theory,  expected  utility  maxi-
mization  is  a  theorem  that  follows  from  the  axioms
of  probability  and  utility  theories  (Fishburn  1981;
Myerson  1991).  In  other  words,  if  an  agent’s  be-
liefs  about  the  uncertain  environment  conform  to
the  axioms  of  probability  theory,  and  its  preferences
obey  the  axioms  of  utility  theory  (see,  for  example,
(Russell  &  Norvig  1995)  page  474),  then  the  agent
Shg~Id  choose  its  actions  so  as  to  maximize  its  ex-
pected  utility. 2
i  !We  would  like  to  stress  that  our  approach  does  not
forbid  that  agents  interact  based  on  protocols.  However,
since  the  protocols  specify  the  agent’s  action  the  agent
d0~  not  need  to  deliberate  about  what  to  do  and  our
approach  is  not  applicable.  If  the  protocol  is  not  appli-
cable  or  leave  a  number  of  alternatives  open  then  the
agent  needs  to  choose,  and  should  do  so  in  a  rational
m~tn~er.
2Some  authors  have  expressed  reseawations  as  to  the
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From: AAAI Technical Report SS-02-02. Compilation copyright © 2002, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. The expected utilities  of alternative  courses of ac-
tion  are  generally  assessed  based on their  expected
results.  Intuitively,  an agent is  attempting to quan-
tify  how much  better  off  it  would be in  a  state  re-
sulting  from it  having performed  a  given action.  In  a
multi-agent  setting,  however, an  agent usually  can-
not anticipate  future states  of the world unless it  can
hypothesize the  actions  of  other  agents.  Therefore,
it  may be beneficial  for  the  agent  to  model other
agents influencing  its  environment  to assess  the  out-
comes and the  utilities  of  its  own actions.  We  say
that  an agent is  ccordinating  with other  agents  pre-
cisely  when  it  considers  the  anticipated  actions  of
others  as  it  chooses its  own  action.
An agent  that  is  trying  to  determine  what  the
other  agents  are  likely  to  do may model them as
rational  as  well,  thereby using expected utility  max-
imization  as  a  descriptive  paradigm.8 This,  in  turn,
leads to  the  possibility  that  they are  similarly  mod-
eling  other agents in choosing their  actions.  In fact,
depending on the  available  information,  this  nested
modeling could  continue  on to  how an  agent  is  mod-
eling  other  agents  that  are  modeling how others  are
modeling,  and  so on.
Thus,  to  rationally  choose its  action  in  a  multi-
agent situation,  an agent should represent  the,  pos-
sibly  nested,  information  it  has  about  the  other
agent(s),  and utilize  it  to  solve  its  own  decision-
making problem.  This  line  of  thought,  that  com-
bines  decision-theoretic  expected utility  maximiza-
tion  with  reasoning  about  other  agent(s)  that  may
reason about others,  leads  to  a  variant  of  game  the-
ory  that  has  been called  a  decision-theoretic  ap-
proach  to  game theory  (DTGT) (Aumann & Bran-
denburger  1995;  Brandenburger  1992;  Kadane &
Larkey 1982; Raiffa  1982).
At least  some of  the  comparison of  DTGT  to  tra-
ditional  equilibrium  analysis  has  to  deal  with the
notion  of  common knowledge  (Aumann 1976). 
proposition,  say  p,  is  common  knowledge  if  and only
if  everyone  knows p,  and  everyone  knows that  ev-
eryone  knows p,  and  everyone  knows that  everyone
knows that  everyone  knows p,  and so  on ad infini-
tum.  In  their  well-known  paper  (Halpern  & Moses
1990),  Halpern and Moses show that,  in  situations
in  which agents  use  realistic  communication chan-
neis  which can lose  messages or  which have uncer-
tain  transmission  times  common  knowledge is  not
achievable in  finite  time unless agents are willing  to
justifiability  of  these axioms. See the discussions  in
(Malmnas  1994) and the  excellent  overview of  descrip-
tive  aspects of decision theory in (Camerer  1995).
aThe  use of  expected  utility  maximization  to predict
and explain  human  decision  making is  widely used in
economics. See the  overview in  (Camerer  1995).
"jump to  conclusions,"  and  assume that  they  know
more than  they really  do. 4
In  other  related  work  in  game  theory,  researchers
have investigated  the  assumptions  and limitations
of  the  classical  equilibrium  concept (Binmore 1982;
Geanakoplos  1992;  Kadane  & Larkey  1982;  Reny
1988; Tan & Werlang 1988).  Unlike  the  outside  ob-
server’s  point of  view in classical  equilibrium anal-
ysis,  DTGT  takes  the  perspective  of  the  individ-
ual  interacting  agent,  with its  current  subjective
state  of  belief.  This  coincides  with  the  subjec-
tive  interpretation  of  probability  theory  used  in
much of  AI (see  (Cheeseman 1985; Neapolitan  1990;
Pearl  1988) and the  references  therein).  Its  distin-
guishing  feature  seems best  summarized by Myerson
((Myerson 1991), Section  3.6):
The decision-analytic  approach to  player i’s  de-
cision  problem is  to  try  to  predict  the  behav-
ior  of  the  players  other  than  i  first,  and then
to  solve  i’s  decision  problem last.  In  contrast,
the  ~sual game-theoretic  approach is  to  analyze
¯  and solve the decision problems  of all  players to-
gether,  like  a  system of  simultaneous equations
in  several  unknowns.
-Binmore  (Binmore  1982)  and  Brandenburger
(Brandenburger  1992) both  point  out  that  unjusti-
fiability  of  common  knowledge  leads  directly  to  the
situation  in  which one has  to  explicitly  model the
decision-making  of  the  agents  involved  given  their
state  of  knowledge, which we are  advocating.  This
modeling is  not  needed if  one  wants  to  talk  only
of  the  possible  equilibria.  Binmore  points  out  that
the  common  treatment  in  game theory  of  equilibria
without any reference  to  the  equilibriating  process
that  achieved the  equilibrium5 accounts for  the  in-
ability  of  predicting  which particular  equilibrinm is
the  right  one and will  actually  be re~li~d,  if  there
happens to  be  more than  one candidate, s
4Halpern  and Moses  consider the concepts of  epsilon
common  knowledge and  eventual  common  knowledge.
However,  in order for  a fact  to be epsilon  or eventual
common  knowledge,  other  facts  have  to  be  common
knowledge  within the,  so called,  view interpretation.  See
(Halpern &  Moses  1990) for  details.  Also,  it  has been
argued  that  common  knowledge can arise  due to  the
agents’ copresence, and, say, visual  contact.  These ar-
guments  are intuitive,  but turn  out to be ditilcult  to
formalize, so we  treat  the issue here as open.
5Binmore  compares  it  to trying to decide which  of the
roots of  the quadratic  equation is  the  ~ight~ solution
without reference to the context in which  the quadratic
equation has arisen.
6Binmore  (Binmore  1994), as well as  others  in game
theory  (Kandori,  MaUath,  ~ Rob 1991; Kandori ~ Rob
1991; Choo  &  Matsuri 1992a; 1992b) and related  fields
..’..The notion  of  nested  beliefs  of  agents  is  also
closely  related  to interactive  belief  systems consid-
ered  in  game theory  (Aumann & Brandenburger
1995;  Aumann  1999a;  Harsanyi  1967;  Mertens & Za-
mir  1985).  In  our  own approach  we decided  to  use
a  representation  that  is  somewhat  more expressive,
since  it  also  includes  models of  others  that  do not
assume their  rationality.  Thus, they  are  able  to  ex-
press  a  richer  spectrum of  the  agents’  decision  mak-
ing situations,  including their  payoff functions,  abil-
ities,  and  information  they  have about  the  world,
but  also  the  possibility  that  other  agents should be
viewed not as  intentional  utility  maximizers, but as
mechanisms  or  simple  objects.  Somewhat related
to  nested  belief  states  is  also  the  familiar  minimax
method for  searching  game trees  (Nilsson  1971).
However, game tree  search  assumes turn  taking  on
the  part  of  the  players  during the course of  the  game
and it  bottoms out  when the  game terminates  or  at
some chosen level.
The issue  of  nested  knowledge has  also  been in-
vestigated  in  the  area  of  distributed  systems (Fa-
gin,  Halpern,  & Vardi 1991) (see  also  (Fagin  et  al.
1995)).  In  (Fagin,  Halpern,  & Vardi  1991)
and colleagues  present  an extensive  model-theoretic
treatment  of  nested  knowledge which includes  a  no-
information  extension  to  handle the  situation  where
an agent runs  out  of  knowledge  at  a finite  level  of
nesting.
Modeling  Agent’s  Knowledge  in
Multi-agent  Environments
We  are  interested  in  a  representation  capable of  ex-
pressing  the  uncertain  state  of  agent’s  knowledge
about  its  environment,  and reflect  the  agent’s  un-
certainty  as to the other agents’ intentions,  abilities,
preferences,  and sensing  capabilities.  On a  deeper
level  of  nesting,  the  agents  may  have information  on
how other  agents  are  likely  to  view them,  how they
themselves  think  they  might be viewed,  and so  on.
Representation
One possible  representation  could  be  based on the
framework  of  Markov decision  processes  (MDP)
(Boutiller,  Dean, & Hanks 1999; Hauskrecht  2000).
A  (partially  observable)  MDP  for  an  agent  i  is  de-
fined  as
MDPi  =<  S,  Ai,  Oi,Ti,  Oi,  Ri  >  (1)
where:
(Smith  1982),  suggest  the  evolutionary  approach  to  the
equilibrating  process.  The  centerpiece  of  these  tech-
niques  lies  in  methods  of  belief  revision,  which  we  in-
vestigated  in  (Gmytrasiewicz,  Nob,  &  Kellogg  1998;
Suryadi  &  Gmytrasiewicz  1999).
¯  S is  a set  of  possible  states  of  the  environment,
¯  Aiis  a set  of  actions  agent i  can execute.
o .’Ti  is  a transition  function Ti :  S x Ai x S -4 [O, 1]
which describes  results  of  agent i’s  actions,  and.
¯ Oi is  the  set  of  observations that  the  agent i  can
make.
¯  Oi is  the  agent’s  observation  function  -  Oi :
Oi x S x A ~ [0,1]  which specifies  probabilities
¯  of observations  if  agent executes various  actions
:in different states.
¯ P~ is  the  reward function  representing  the  agent
i’s  preferences; P~ :  S --* R.
MDP’s can  be  extended  to  involve  multiple
agents.  Multi-agent  MDP’s  have  been  proposed  by
Boutilier  (Boutilier  1999) and by Milch and Koller
(Koller  & Milch 2002),  but both of  these  extensions
are  not expressive  enough to  represent  the  agents’
possibly  different  states  of  knowledge about their
environment,  their  knowledge about their  states  of
l~nowledge,  and  so  on.
To  define  an  MDP  capable  of  expressing  the
agent’s  private  information  about  other  agents  we
consider  an  agent  i  that  is  interacting  with  N-  1
other  agents  numbered  1,  2,  ...,  i  -  1,  i  +  1,  ...,  N.
We define  a  recursive  MDP  (RMDP) as:
2MDP~  =< RS, A, 0~,  T~, 0~,  P~ > (2)
where:
¯  ’RS is  a  set  of  augmented possible  worlds.  Each
~ augmented possible  world  is  a  pair  (s,P(M-i)),
such  that  s  E S and  P(M-i)  is  a  probability.
distribution  over possible  models  of  other  agents.
Each model  is  a  list  of  models  of  the other  agents:
2Y/I_i  = (Mt,M2,...,M,-t,Mi+I,...,MN).  Each
model of  a  an agent  j  can be represented  in  three
.ipossible  forms:
{
RMDPj -  the  intentional  model,
¯  Mj  = No -  In.foj -  the  no-information  model,
¯ Sub-  lntj -  the  sub-intentional  model.
(3)
¯  A --  x Aj is  the  set  of joint  moves  of all  agents.
¯ Ti is  a transition  function  Ti :  S x A x S -~ [0,1]
which describes results  of all  agent’s actions.
¯  O,,  Oi and P~ are  defined  as  above.
The fact  that  an  intentional  model of  another
agent  is  part  of  an  agent’s  RMDP  gives  rise  to
nesting  of  models.  The no-information  model can
also  be  represented  as  an  MDP  (say  one  in  which
Ri  = 0),  and the  sub-intentional  model can be  rep-
resented  as  a  probability  distribution  over actions
3(Gmytrasiewicz  & Durfee  2000).  Recursive  MDP
allows  an agent  to  represent  its  uncertainty  as  to
the  state  of the  "physical"  world (as  a  possible  ele-
ment of  S),  and also  what are  the  possible  and likely
states  of  other  agents’  knowledge about  the  world,
their  preferences  and available  actions,  their  states
of  knowledge  about  others’,  and so on.
Our definition  above is  fairly  general;  RMDPs  are
related  to  the  knowledge hierarchies  considered  in
(Aumann  1999a),  which in  turn  are  similar  to  re-
cursive  Kripke structures  defined  in  (Gmytrasiewicz
& Durfee 1992).  If  one retains  only  the  probabil-
ity  distribution  Pi(RS),  the  knowledge-belief  hier-
archies  defined  in  (Aumann  1999b)  obtain.  If  one
omits  the  other  agents’  models from augmented pos-
sible  worlds,  stochastic  games (Fudenberg & Tirole
1991) similar  to  ones investigated  in  (Boutilier  1999)
and (Koller  & Milch 2002) obtain.
Values  and  Optimality
The recursive  MDPs  give  rise  to  agent’s  informa-
tion  states,  just  as  POMDPs  do (Hauskrecht  2000;
Russell  & Norvig 1995).  The information  state  sum-
marizes all  of  the  agent’s  previous observations  and
actions.  Under some  conditions  it  turns  out  that  the
agent’s belief  states,  b(S),  i.e.  probability  distribu-
tions  over states,  are  sufficient  and compact repre-
sentations  of information states.
Agent’s  beliefs  evolve  with  time  and they  form
a  belief-state  MDP.  The new belief  state,  bt(s) 
a  function  of  the  previous  state,  bt-z(s),  the  last
action,  and the  new  observation,  in  the  predict-act-
observe cycle (Russell  & Norvig 1995), section  17.4,
and  (Hanskrecht  2000):
O(ot,  8, a,-z) b,(s)  =  PCo,  lbt-z,  at-z)  rCsl  -z,  8’)bt=, 
s’68
(4)
For  an  infinite  horizon  case,  each  belief  state  has
an  associated  optimal  value  reflecting  the  maximum
discounted payoff the  agent can expect in  this  belief
state:
V* (b)  = maza6A, [~  ~ R(s,  a,  a’)P(s’ls,  a)b(s) 
s68  s’ 68
7 ~  ~  O(o,s,a)bCs)V’Cb)]
060 s6S
and the  optimal action  policy p* :  b -*  Ai is:
p*(b)  argma~ca6A,[~’~ ~  RC s, a, s’)bCs) +
s68  s’ 6S
7 ~  ~  0(o,  s,  a)bCs)VCb)l
060 a6S
The above is  further  complicated by the  presence
of other agents since the P(slai, s’) is  also dependent
on these  agents’  actions.  We  have:
P(slai,  s’)=  ~  T(s’,(al,...,a,,...aN),s)P(a-ilM-i)
a-16A-i
The above makes explicit  the  fact  that  the  prob-
ability  of  changing the  state  of  the  system depends
not  only on the  agent’s  i  action,  ai,  but  also  the
joint  action  of  the  other agents,  a-i.  To predict  the
actions  of  the  other  agents,  i  can use their  models,
which contributes  the  P(a-~]M-i) factor  above.
The fact  that  the  agent  i  has  to  use  the  models
of  the  other  agents to  predict  their  likely  actions,
and  only  then  compute its  own optimal  action  is
the  essence of the  decision-theoretic  approach, as  ex-
pressed  above by the  quote  from Myerson (Myerson
1991).
Alternative  Representation
If  the  information  contained  in  the  RMDP’s  is
compiled into  payoff  matrices  then  recursive  model
structures,  defined  in  (Gmytrasiewicz  & Durfee
20Q.0),  result.  As  we  discussed  in  (Gmytrasiewicz
&  Durfee  2000),  the  RMDP’s  are  infinite,  i.e.,  they
accommodate  infinite  nesting  of  agents’  beliefs,  but
they  could  be  terminated  by  no-information  mod-
els  if  the  knowledge  of  the  agent(s)  is  nested  only
to  a  finite  level.  In  Figure  1  we  have  depicted  a  fi-
nite  recursive  model  structure,  depicting  a  state  of
knowledge  of  agent  R1 interacting  with an  agent R2
as  depicted  in  Figure  2 (see  (Gmytrasiewicz & Dur-
fee 2000) for details.)
The no-information  models that  terminate  the  re-
cursive  nesting  in  our  example are  at  the  leafs  of
the  recursive  model structure  in  Figure  1.  These
models represent  the  limits  of  the  agents’  knowl-
edge: The model No-Info2 represents  the  fact  that,
in  the  case  when R2 cannot  see  P2,  Rz knows that
R2 has  no knowledge that  would allow  it  to  model
Rz. Thus,  the  uncertainty  is  associated  with  R2,
and the  model’s superscript  specifies  that  the  state
of  no information is  associated  with its  ancestor  on
the  second level  of  the  structure  in  Figure  1.  The
No-Infoz  model terminating  the  middle  branch  of
the  recursive  structure  represents  Rz’s own lack  of
knowledge  (on the  first  level  of  the structure)  of  how
it  is  being modeled  by R2, if  R2 can see  through the
trees.  In  general,  the  no-information  models can
represent  knowledge limitations  on any level;  the
limitations  of  Rz’s  own knowledge,z  Rz’s  knowing
the  knowledge  limitations  of other  agents,  and so on.
VNote  that  we  assume the agent can introspect.  This
amounts  to the  agent’s being able to  detect the  lack of8 I
I o
2
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No-lnfo 2 No*Info  i
Figure  1:  Recursive  Model Structure  depicting  Rx’s
Decision-Making Situation  in  Example 1.
Rj R2
Figure  2:  Example  Scenario  of  Interacting  Agents.
The no-information  models are  related  to  the  prob-
lem of  "only  knowing", discussed  in  (Halpern  1993;
Lakemeyer  1993) and related  references.
In  (Gmytrasiewicz,  Noh, & Kellogg  1998; Suryadi
& Gmytrasiewicz  1999)  we show  how the  models
and their  probabilities,  contained  in  the  recursive
model structure,  can be  updated based on the  other
agents’  observed  behavior  using  Bayes rule.  Using
the  notation  in  the  paper,  this  update  is  one that
modifies the  probability  distribution  over models of
other  agents,  P(M-i),  given observation of  their  be-
havior,  o-i,  as:
eCM-,lo-,)  = e(o-,IM-,) (5)
statements in its  knowledge  base that  describe  beliefs
nested deeper than the given level.
In  (Gmytrasiewicz  & Durfee  2000)  we described
how dynamic  programming  can  be  used  to  solve
an agent’s  i  recursive  model structure  yielding  the
agent’s  optimal  action.  In  (Gmytrasiewicz & Durfee
2000) we called  the  recursive  model structure  with
the  DP solution  and  Recursive  Modeling  Method
(RMM). Dynamic programming  is  applicable  be-
cause it  is  possible  to  express  the  solution  to  the
problem of  choice  that  maximizes expected  utility
on a  given  level  of  modeling in  terms  of  the  solu-
tions  to  choices  of  the  agents  modeled on deeper
levels.  Thus, to  solve  the  optimization  problem on
one level  requires  solutions  to  subproblems on the
lower level.  This  means that  the  problem exhibits
optimal  substructure  (Bellman 1957; Cormen, Leis-
erson,  & Rivest  1990),  and  that  a  solution  using
dynamic  programming can  be  formulated.  The so-
lution  traverses  the  recursive  model structure  prop-
agating  the  information  bottom-up. The result  is  an
assignment of expected utilities  to  the agent’s alter-
native  actions,  based on all  of  the  information  the
agent  has  at  hand about the  decision-making  situa-
tion.  The rational  agent  can then  choose an  action
with the  highest  expected utility.
¯  Clearly,  the  bottom-up dynamic programming so-
lution  requires  that  the  recursive  model  structure  be
finite  and terminate.  Thus, we have to  make  the  fol-
lowing assumption:
Ass-mption  1:  The recursiue  model  structure,
defined in Equation  1,  is  finite.
’The  assumption  above  complements  an  assump-
tionthat  the  agents possess  infinitely  nested knowl-
edge~  called  common  knowledge or  mutual  knowl-
edge,  frequently  made  in  AI and in  traditional  game
theory.  As we mentioned,  these  two  assumptions
lead to  two solution  concepts;  one used in  our  work,
which is  decision-theoretic  and  implemented with
dynamic programming,  the  other  one  based  on the
notion of equilibria  (seen as fixed points  of an infl-
nit~  hierarchy  of  nested models.)
¯  AS  we  describe  in  (Gmytrasiewicz  &  Durfee  2000),
the  DP  solution  of  the  hierarchy  depicted  in  Fig-
~ire  I  yields  a  unique  solution:  The  best  choice  for
R1  is  to  move  toward  point  P2  and  make  an  observa-
tion  from  there.  It  is  the  rational  coordinated  action
given  Rl’S  state  of  knowledge,  since  the  computation
included  all  of  the  information  Rx  has  about  agent
R2’s  expected  behavior.  Intuitively,  this  means  that
Rf:believes  that  P~  is  so  unlikely  to  go  to  P2  that
RI.  believes  it  should  go  there  itself.
If  the  interaction  depicted  in  Figure  2  were  to
be  :sought  using  equilibria  and  aesumlng  common
knowledge,  it  would  turn  out  that  there  are  two
equilibria,  one  corresponding  to  two  possible  assign-
ments  of  tasks  to  agents.  Were  the  number  of  tasks
5(or  agents) larger,  as in  the air  defense scenario be-
low, the  number  of equilibria  would  be large,  and the
agents  would be unable to  decide  which equilibrium
to choose and what to  do.  This situation  mirrors  the
problems described  by Binmore in  (Binmore 1994).
Some  Experiments
Our air  defense  domain consists  of  some number of
anti-air  units  whose  mission is  to  defend a  specified
territory  from a  number  of  attacking  missiles  (see
Figure  3).  The defense units  have to  coordinate  and
decide  which missiles  to  intercept,  given the  char-
acteristics  of  the  threat,  and given  what they  can
expect of  the  other defense units.  The utility  of the
agents’  actions  in  this  case expresses  the  desirabil-
ity  of  minimizing the  damage  to  the  defended terri-
tory.  The threat  of an attacking  missile  was assessed
based on the  size  of its  warhead  and its  distance  from
the  defended territory.  Further,  the  defense  units
considered  the  hit  probability,  P(H),  with  which
their  interceptors  would  be effective  against  each of
the  hostile  missiles.  The product of  this  probability
and a  missile  threat  was the  measure of  the  expected
utility  of  attempting to  intercept  the  missile.
Figure  3:  MICE  Simulation  of  the  Air  Defense  Do-
main.
As we mentioned,  it  is  easy  to  see  the  advantage
of  using decision-theoretic  approach to  game  theory
as  implemented  in  RMM  vs.  the  traditional  game-
theoretic  solution  concept of  equilibria.  Apart from
the  need  for  common  knowledge the  agents  have to
share to justify  equilibria,  the  problem  is  that  there
may be many equilibria  and  no clear  way to  choose
the  "right"  one to  guide the  agent’s  behavior.
¯  In  all  of  the  experiments  we rans,  each  of  two
defense units  could  launch three  interceptors,  and
were faced  with an attack  by six  incoming missiles.
Our experiments  was aimed  at  determining  the
quality  of  modeling and  coordination  achieved  by
the  tLMM  agents  in  a  team,  when paired  with  human
agents,  and  when  compared to  other  strategies.  To
evaluate  the  quality  of  the  agents’  performance, the
results  were expressed  in  terms  of  (1)  the  number
of intercepted  targets,  i.e.,  targets  the defense units
attempted  to  intercept,  and (2)  the  total  expected
damage  to  ~endly forces  after  all  six  interceptors
were launched.
The  target  selection  strategies  are as  follows:
¯  Random:  selection  randomly generated.
¯ Independent,  no  modeling:  selection  of  arg
maxjIP(Hij)  x Tj} for  agent 
0  Human: s  selection  by human.
¯  RMM:  selection  by  RMM.
As shown  in  Figure  4 and Figure  5,  we found that
the  alI-RMM  team  outperformed  the  human and  in-
dependent  teams.
¯  We  found  that  the  human performance  was very
similar  to  the  performance of  independent  agents.
The most  obvious  reason  for  this  is  that  humans
tend to depend  on their  intuitive  strategies  for  coor-
dination,  and,  in  this  case,  found it  hard to  engage
in  deeper,  normative,  decision-theoretic  reasoning.
Sometimes the  ways human subjects  choose  a  mis-
sile  were different  and quite  arbitrary.  Some  of  them
attempted to  intercept  the  3 left-most  or  fight-most
missiles,  depending whether they  were in  charge  of
the  left  or  the  right  defense battery.  This led  to
¢]ifliculties  when  the  missiles  were clustered  at  the
center  area  and  to  much duplicated  effort.  Others
tended to  choose missiles  with the  largest  missile
size.  ¯Still  others tried  to consider the multiplication
of the missile size and the hit  probability,  but did not
model the  other  agent  appropriately.  The perfor-
mance of  the  tLMM  team was not  perfect,  however,
since  the  agents were equipped with limited  and un-
certain  knowledge of  each  other.  The performance
SFor an on-line demonstra-
tion  of  the  air  defense domain  refer  to  the  Web  page
http://daii.uta.edu/Air.html.
9We  should  remark that  our  human  subjects  were
CSE and  EE graduate  students  who were  informed
about the criteria  for target  selection.  We  would  expect
that  anti-air  specialists,  equipped  with a modern  defense
doctrine,  could perform better  than our subjects.  How-
ever, the defense doctrine rem~-.q  classified  and was  not
available to us at  this  point.
6
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Figure  4:  Average number  of  intercepted  targets
(over 100 runs).
Average  total  expected  damage
12oo
Figure 5:  Average total  expected damage  (over  100
rims).
of  the  heterogeneous teams again also  suggests  the
favorable quality  of  coordination  achieved  by RMM
agents.
Conclusions
This paper proposed a decision-theoretic  approach
to  game theory  (DTGT)  as  a  paradigm for  design-
ing agents that are able to  intelligently  interact  and
coordinate actions  with other agents in  multi-agent
environments.  We defined  a  general  multi-agent
version of  Markov  decision  processes,  called  recur-
sire  MDP’s,  and illustrated  assumptions, solution
method, and an application  of  our approach. We  ar-
gued that  the DTGT  approach  is  a viable  alternative
to  the  traditional  game-theoretic approach  based on
equilibria.
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